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Abstract
Cooperative intrusion detection use several intrusion detection systems (IDS) and analyzers in order to build a reliable overview
of the monitored system trough a central security information and event management system (SIEM). In such environment, the
deﬁnition of a shared vocabulary describing the exchanged information between tools is prominent. Since these pieces of infor-
mation are structured, we propose in this paper to use an ontological representation based on Description Logics (DLs) which is a
powerful tool for knowledge representation. Moreover, DLs are able to ensure a decidable reasoning. An alert correlation prototype
is presented using this ontology, and an illustrative attack scenario is carried out to show the usefulness of the proposed ontology.
c© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
Peer-review under responsibility of the Conference Program Chairs.
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1. Introduction
Information systems security is a sensitive issue which requires the deployment of several security mechanisms
and tools. We generally use prevention systems such as authentication, access control, ﬁrewalls, etc. However,
these mechanisms are not suﬃcient to fully protect systems against malicious attacks. Indeed, computer systems
often exhibit vulnerabilities, which allow attackers to bypass preventive mechanisms. In addition, some of these
systems focus on the protection against external attacks, while the majority of attacks are internal. Thus, the use of
prevention systems only is not enough, hence a second layer of security is necessary, such as the intrusion detection.
Unfortunately, IDSs are still imperfect for two reasons. First, they generate a very large number of low-level alerts,
where most of them are false positive which is alerts generated in the absence of attacks. And second, they suﬀer from
false negative which is the absence of alerts in the presence of attacks.
In order to overcome these problems, a promising approach is the so-called cooperative intrusion detection21,4,
which allows various intrusion detection tools to cooperate. The objective of such cooperation can be achieved
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through diﬀerent detection approaches, such as misuse detection and anomaly detection which are complementary.
One can also use several IDS based on the same approach, for example the misuse one, but with diﬀerent rule bases.
In addition to IDS, other analyzers should be considered in the cooperative intrusion detection such as network and
vulnerability scanners in order to correlate alerts with contextual information, by including for example topology and
cartography. In fact, nowadays all security tools have to cooperate using a central security information and event
management system (SIEM) .
In this case, the deﬁnition of a shared vocabulary to describe exchanged information is a major concern. In general
this information is structured and is given in XML. For instance, this is the case of alerts in IDMEF (for Intrusion
Detection Message Exchange Format)1 and TAXII (Trusted Automated eXchange of Indicator Information)2, as well
as the vulnerabilities in OVAL (Open Vulnerability and Assessment Language)3 and STIX (Structured Threat Infor-
mation eXpression)4. However, information is generally based on diﬀerent taxonomies, and given in XML which
is limited to a syntactic representation. Given that XML representation is devoid of semantics, it is more beneﬁ-
cial to change from taxonomies to ontology speciﬁcation languages12,9, which are able to simultaneously serve as
recognition, reporting and correlation languages.
Ontology speciﬁcation languages such as OWL5 and DAML+OIL6 use a fragment of the ﬁrst order logic, namely
Description Logics (DLs for short). Indeed, DLs are convenient to represent structured information. They are decid-
able in the sense that reasoning can be achieved in a ﬁnite time. Also, a number of sophisticated DL-based reasoners
have been developed such as Pellet11 and FaCT ++16.
Based on several existing knowledge representation models used in SIEM such as works done in8,1,2,7, our contri-
bution in this paper is, on one hand, to enhance existing representations by regrouping a large amount of information
into a domain ontology. This will oﬀer a comprehensive and extensible knowledge representation which can be used
in many event correlation systems.
On the other hand, given that tools used in SIEM are not totally reliable, usually conﬂicts appear between them15,20.
For example, one can easily see that IDSs are not fully reliable since they generate many false positives and false neg-
atives. Thus, it is very important to resolve these conﬂicts in order to exploit the cooperation. Hence, our second
contribution is an ontological reasoning approach to correlate alerts in order to reduce the number of alerts, in partic-
ular false positives.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a background on alert correlation. Section 3
brieﬂy recall some works of knowledge representation used in intrusion detection and then presents the proposed
ontology. Section 4 presents an architecture of an alert correlation system based on DLs reasoning with an illustrative
experiment. In section 5 some related works are brieﬂy discussed. Section 6 concludes this paper.
2. Background
The role of the intrusion detection is to monitor events that occur in computers or networks and to analyze them
in order to discover signs of intrusions. These events are often deﬁned as attempts to violate the security policy.
Intrusions have several causes such as malware (e.g, Virus, Trojan, etc.), external attackers that access the information
system via open networks such as Internet, unauthorized users that try to gain unauthorized privileges or users that
abuse of their privileges10.
Nowadays, IDSs play an important role in computer security. However, the large deployment of IDS in operational
environments in the last two decades has showed their weaknesses. Their main problem lies mainly in the excess
of reported alerts. The security operator is often quickly overwhelmed by the amount of alerts. Hence, he/she only
examines alerts from time to time, which may cause missing of some critical attacks. In fact, the use of IDS become
similar to the use of surveillance cameras which are viewed only when a problem occurs.
1 http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4765.txt
2 https://taxii.mitre.org
3 http://oval.mitre.org/
4 https://stix.mitre.org
5 http://www.w3.org/2004/OWL/
6 http://www.daml.org/2001/03/daml+oil-index
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Another weakness is the poor semantic of the reported alerts. The security operator generally cannot determine the
severity of an alert without resorting to a manual analysis of the events that caused the alert. In addition, intrusions
detection tools are faced to the problem of false negative, which is the absence of alerts in the presence of attacks.
To overcome these problems, it is essential to cooperate several security tools to build reliable capability of coor-
dination and correlation. There are several key functions in the alert correlation process.
• Removing redundancy: one basic function is to determine whether two alerts have been generated according to
the observation of the same event. Removing alert redundancy reduces the number of alerts to be processed.
• Aggregating alerts: some attacks cause more than one elementary event. Thus, the combination of elementary
events reduces the ﬂow of alerts.
• Merging alerts: after grouping alerts into clusters, an advanced function of correlation will be to produce global
alerts summarizing the malicious activity reported by these groups of alerts.
• Recognizing attack scenarios (context correlation): this function is more advanced and requires more complex
mechanisms to determine certain type of attacks which are carried out in several stages. Attacks are best
understood as scenarios than individually.
3. Ontological based speciﬁcation and reasoning for Alert Correlation
3.1. Knowledge Representation in Intrusion Detection
In front of an intrusion detection environment characterized by a very low detection rate, a high rate of false alerts,
and a poor granularity of the information provided by alerts, a huge eﬀort has been made by the intrusion detection
community for the standardization of threats and attacks. The resulted data formalisms (e.g IDMEF, TAXII, STIX,
etc.) has provided a space for open communication between security tools and has been largely used in many alert
correlation systems4,6.
Despite their diﬀerent approaches, alert correlation systems have to share knowledge about attacks and contexts in
which they occur. However, these approaches do not care about how they represent their knowledge and how they use
it. We think that having a coherent and formal model to represent knowledge is important for any correlation system.
M2D2 is among the most important work in this area, it is a relational model that regroup essential information used
in correlation, such as alerts, events, nodes, softwares, etc. In 2009, this model was revised by adding new concepts
and by regrouping concepts into classes, this new model is called M4D48. A part of our work in this paper can be
seen as an extension of the M4D4.
3.2. The Proposed Ontology
Strassner deﬁnes the ontology as follows : “An ontology is a formal, explicit speciﬁcation of a shared, machine-
readable vocabulary and meanings, in the form of various entities and relationships between them, to describe knowl-
edge about the contents of one or more related subject domains throughout the life cycle of its existence”13. This
meaning of ontology is used mostly in the context of knowledge sharing.
IDMEF and M4D4 are among the most important work in terms of knowledge representation in the domain of
intrusion detection. However, IDMEF does not contain enough information because it describes just alerts, and
M4D4 is proposed in the context of network intrusion detection including contextual information (cartography and
topology) and the description of vulnerabilities.
In this section, we propose an ontological conceptualization that combines the representation of IDMEF, M4D4,
TAXII and other information sources such as OVAL, STIX and NVD7. Generally, we can divide knowledge in intru-
sion detection into 5 groups8 : Analyzers, Events and alerts, Attacks and Vulnerabilities, Contextual information, and
Users and Attackers. Figure 1 shows the main concepts and relations of the proposed ontology.
7 http://nvd.nist.gov
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Fig. 1. A domain ontology for intrusion detection.
• Analyzers : this category contains information about several kind of security tools that can be used to protect
an information system, such as IDS, Network Mapper, Vulnerability Scanner, Firewall, Integrity checker, Anti-
malware, etc.
• Events and alerts : whatever the kind of the used security tools, they trigger a message when an event occur or
at least a heartbeat message to report their activities. There are several kind of message such as alerts sent by
detection tools (e.g. IDS), reports sent by scanner tools (e.g. vulnerabilities scanner), Logs sent by applications
and devices (e.g. Firewall or Routers), etc. In general these messages are well structured and can be provided
in XML.
• Attacks and Vulnerabilities : vulnerabilities refer to security ﬂaws in softwares that can be used by an adversary
to attack the information system. They can be also related to human errors and mistakes. In general, a vulnera-
bility aﬀects a product, have some consequences if it is successfully exploited, and some countermeasures may
be applied to avoid it.
• Contextual information (topology and cartography) : this category involves information about the circumstance
in which an attack is attempted, such as the conﬁguration of the targeted host or product, the network topology,
etc.
• Users and Attackers : this category concerns information about the users proﬁles and attacker intentions.
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Fig. 2. Ontology based alert correlation architecture.
4. Ontology based event correlation
The use of the proposed ontology is very suitable for event correlation within a SIEM, when many tools have
to cooperate and to exchange information. Indeed, we developed a prototype of event correlation system to show
the importance and usefulness of this ontology. The architecture of our system consists of two essential modules :
the conversion module that puts reported alerts into the ontology, as well as contextual information (topology and
cartography), and the correlation module that allows reasoning about the constructed ontology. Figure 2 summarizes
the architecture of the correlation system.
In order to use an ontology within an application, it must be speciﬁed in some formal representation. Indeed, a
variety of languages exists that are used to represent conceptual models, with varying expressiveness, ease of use
and computational complexity. We used OWL, which is a recommendation of The World Wide Web Consortium
(W3C), widely used in web semantic. OWL is based on Description Logics. Description Logics are known for their
expressiveness and their clearly deﬁned semantics that allow a decidable reasoning.
In this work, we build our ontology using the API Jena8, and the reasoning is provided by Pellet9 which is a full
OWL-DL reasoner.
4.1. Populating our Ontology
To populate our ontology we need to use several tools. Information about hosts and network topology are given
using Nmap10. This tool can provide many information such as the running hosts and their operating systems, the dif-
ferent softwares listening in these hosts with their corresponding version, and many further information. Information
about the vulnerabilities of systems and softwares are given using Nessus11. Information about attacks are given in
real time by IDS, in our system we used Snort12 with a set of VRT and community rules. Note that it is also possible
to insert directly information into the ontology by the security operators.
4.2. Reasoning with our Ontology
Reasoning is important in ontology because it allows to ensure the quality of ontology. Indeed, through the use of a
reasoner, it is possible to test whether concepts are non-contradictory and to derive implicit relations. For example, we
deﬁned a new concept Plaussible attack as an alert that satisﬁes the following conditions: 1) the alert is generated by
8 http://jena.apache.org/
9 http://clarkparsia.com/pellet/
10 http://nmap.org/
11 http://www.tenable.com/products/nessus/
12 http://www.snort.org/
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an analyzer that actually monitors the target machine, and 2) the machine is actually vulnerable to the attack reported
in the alert.
Formally, given an alert generated by an analyzer Z and reports a vulnerability V , a Plaussible attack is deﬁned as
follows.
Plaussible attack ⊆
∀ reported-by.{Z}  ∀ has-classiﬁcation.(∀ refers-to.{V})  ∀ has-target.(∀ isvulnerable.{V} 
∀ monitored-by.{Z})
(1)
Where,
monitored-by is the inverse of monitors, monitored-by ≡ (monitors)−1.
reported-by is the inverse trigers, reported-by ≡ (trigers)−1.
monitors is a relationship between Node and Analyzer, monitors ≡ hosted-in  connected  netNodes.
netNodes is the inverse of connected, netNodes ≡ (connected)−1.
We also deﬁned the concept False alert which is the negation of the relationship Plaussible attack. This concerns:
1) an alert generated by an analyzer that does not actually monitor the target of the attack, or 2) an alert where the
target is not actually aﬀected by the vulnerability reported in the alert. Formally, False alert is deﬁned as follows.
False alert ⊆
(∀ has-classiﬁcation.(∀ refers-to.{V})  ∀ has-target.(∀ isnot-vulnerable.{V})) unionsq
(∀ reported-by.{Z}  ∀ has-target.(∀ isnot-monitored-by.{Z}))
(2)
These two new concepts will be used in the experiment of the next subsection. Note that many other inferred
concepts can be proposed to improve our correlation system.
4.3. Illustrative experiment
This experiment consists on lunching a set of attacks against a linux vulnerable machine run on our simulation
platform13. Here, we have used Metaspoitable14 as a victim and the metasploit framework15 as an attacker. Then,
we process reported alerts during the experiment using our correlation system prototype. As shown in Figure 2, our
architecture needs information from many analyzers, namely IDS, network scanner and vulnerability scanner. Snort
has generated 13 alerts during the experiment. Reported alerts are given in Table 1.
We need also information about vulnerabilities, cartography and topology of network. To obtain this information,
we have ﬁrst scanned the target machine using Nmap, which has detected all services running in this node, namely
ftp, ssh, telnet, smtp, domain, http, rpcbind, netbios-ssn, microsoft-ds, exec, login, shell, rmiregistry, ingreslock, nfs,
ccproxy-ftp, mysql, postgresql, vnc, X11, and irc. Then, this victim machine was scanned by Nessus, which has
reported 160 vulnerabilities. Note that we have tried all exploits in the Metasploit framework that targeted a linux
machine, namely 44 exploits lunched against the services cited bellow.
Reports from IDSs and scanners are processed and translated into the ontology. Then, we launch the reasoner
(Pellet) to infer the new concepts False alert and Plausible attack, and results are given in Table 2.
In this experiment, our system has correctly classiﬁed reported alerts as plausible attack or false alert, depending
on: 1) if the victim machine is actually aﬀected or not by the vulnerability referenced in the alert, or 2) if the victim
machine is actually monitored by the IDS. Unfortunately, our system is not able to take a decision when information
is missing. For example, the alert “NETBIOS SMB-DS IPC$ share access” do not refer to any vulnerability, so our
system is not able to classify it. A solution to this problem would be to improve snort signatures by completing missed
vulnerability references.
13 for the lack of space, this platform is not presented in this paper.
14 http://sourceforge.net/projects/metasploitable/. Metasploitable is an intentionally vulnerable Linux virtual machine. This VM can be used to
conduct security training, test security tools, and practice common penetration testing techniques.
15 http://www.metasploit.com/. Metasploit is an open source penetration test framework.
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Table 1. Alerts detected by snort. The last column contains the decision of our correlation system.
Count Alert message CVE reference Nessus scan Correlation
1 (portscan) TCP Portscan no ref not nulnerable Not classiﬁed
1 SNMP AgentX/tcp request cve,2002-0012,
cve,2002-0013
not nulnerable False alert
3 COMMUNITY SIP TCP/IP message
ﬂooding directed to SIP proxy
no ref not vulnerable Not classiﬁed
1 SNMP request tcp cve,2002-0012,
cve,2002-0013
not vulnerable False alert
1 WEB-PHP piranha passwd.php3 access cve,2000-0322 not vulnerable False alert
3 NETBIOS SMB-DS IPC$ share access no ref not vulnerable Not classiﬁed
1 COMMUNITY WEB-CGI Twiki shell
command execution
cve,2005-2877 vulnerable Plausible Attack
1 SERVER-WEBAPP PHP-CGI remote ﬁle
include attempt
cve,2012-1823 vulnerable Plausible Attack
1 MALWARE-BACKDOOR UnrealIRCd
backdoor command execution attempt
cve:2010-2075 vulnerable Plausible Attack
Table 2. Alert correlation results.
False alert Plausible attack Not classiﬁed
3 3 7
5. RELATED WORKS
The automatic correlation of information from diﬀerent security systems has been a vivid topic of research for over
a decade21,4. Numerous approaches have been developed for correlating alerts and other log entries to strength the
power of intrusion detection systems. Here, we brieﬂy discuss only related works regarding the use of ontology.
Ontology can be used in many ﬁeld in SIEM, such as to analyze user behavior and system activities, or to identify
known attack patterns, or also to analysis abnormal behavior and activity of both systems and users. Note that semantic
approaches have many advantages over existing approaches, mainly two aspects: the formal and extensible knowledge
representation capability and the decidable reasoning.
Using ontology in computer security is relatively new. The ﬁrst research work was done by Jeﬀrey Undercoﬀer et
al. 17. They produced an ontology that specify a model of computer attack. Their ontology is based on attack strategies
which is categorized according to targeted system components, tools of attacks, consequences of attacks, and location
of attackers. They present their model as a target-centric ontology.
Since the work of Jeﬀrey many other ontologies was proposed. In18, Wang et al. propose an Ontology for Vulner-
ability Management (OVM) which contains several concepts about vulnerabilities, aﬀected products, consequences
and countermeasures, etc. Authors have used their own implementation of their ontology without referring to any
languages. In2, Azevedo et al. propose a domain-ontology with more generic and abstract concepts in the ﬁeld
of computer security, serving as the basis for the construction of other speciﬁc security-domain-ontologies called
CoreSec. In5, Jian-bo et al. provide an ontology-based attack model which is used to assess the information system
security from attack angle. The proposed ontology consists of ﬁve dimensions, which include attack impact, attack
vector, attack target, vulnerability and defense.
More recently, many semantic description methods for the security policy has been proposed. In14, an ontology-
based method is presented to solve the problem of the semantic description and veriﬁcation of a security policy. Onto-
ACM (ontology-based access control model), is a semantic analysis model proposed by Chang Choi et al. 3 to address
the diﬀerence in the permitted access control between service providers and users. More over, in19 ontologies are used
to perform threat analysis and develop defensive strategies for mobile security. Autors has proposed on ontology-
based approach that can identify an attack proﬁle in accordance with structural signature of mobile viruses, and also
overcome the uncertainty regarding the probability of an attack being successful, thanks to semantic reasoning.
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6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We proposed in this paper a domain ontology for a cooperative intrusion detection based on several data sources
such as IDMEF, TAXII, STIX, M4D4, OVAL, NVD, etc. This ontology is implemented with OWL which is recom-
mended by W3C since 2004 for the representation of ontologies in the Web Semantic. OWL is based on Description
Logics which are a decidable fragment of the ﬁrst order logic and are well suitable to represent structured information.
We have illustrated the usefulness of this ontology through an application in the context of alert correlation. This
application allows automatic translation of alerts generated by IDSs to OWL, as well as contextual information gen-
erated by network and vulnerability scanners. Furthermore, a two new important concepts are inferred from the
constructed ontology, the concept of plausible attack and the concept of f alse alert. These two concepts are very
important to reduce the amount of alerts by analyzing in priority plausible attack, and by discarding f alse alert.
Other actions can be performed in the perspective to complete this work. Indeed, the proposed ontology need to be
completed by more concepts and relation to allow a more comprehensive correlation rules, and also by using other
reasoning mechanisms provided by OWL-Dl such as the veriﬁcation of consistency and the satisﬁability of concepts.
Moreover, we are now working to perform a more consistent experiment with more realistic and complex scenarios.
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